“Gravitation is not responsible for people falling in love. Albert Einstein”
While developing a philosophical understanding of emotion it has come to mind that research over the years has provided a model consideration for understanding the valence affect. This valence affect with regard to the Decision making process that from a cognitive standpoint is inclusive of logical and emotive forces. This process was a long one in which I thought to place ourselves, in terms of a self evident point of expression, so as to suggest, the next question rests on a Inductive realization with which the history has thus far been explained.
So the totality of this entry is an examination with regard to emotion and its necessity in the logic analysis approach to such a question. To what is self evident. To what is decisive.
The next step is always important. So I had to demonstrate the current historical examination for what has been done with regard to emotion so that I could reveal some of the work that I had done in the years past.
This work then is a stepping point toward a new and entertaining thought about what the next technologies might reveal about our emotive and logical state of being as we make our decisions with all that we had gained with in experience. So the next step is a series of posts that will reflect this attempt by me to objectify what has thought to been totally subjective and without regard.
“No aspect of our mental life is more important to the quality and meaning of our existence than emotions. They are what make life worth living, or sometimes ending. So it is not surprising that most of the great classical philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume—had recognizable theories of emotion, conceived as responses to certain sorts of events of concern to a subject, triggering bodily changes and typically motivating characteristic behavior. What is surprising is that in much of the twentieth-century philosophers of mind and psychologists tended to neglect them—perhaps because the sheer variety of phenomena covered by the word “emotion” and its closest neighbors tends to discourage tidy theory. In recent years, however, emotions have once again become the focus of vigorous interest in philosophy, as well as in other branches of cognitive science. In view of the proliferation of increasingly fruitful exchanges between researchers of different stripes, it is no longer useful to speak of the philosophy of emotion in isolation from the approaches of other disciplines, particularly psychology, neurology, evolutionary biology, and even economics. While it is quite impossible to do justice to those approaches here, some sidelong glances in their direction will aim to suggest their philosophical importance. de Sousa, Ronald, “Emotion“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),”
“If the view that emotions are a kind of perception can be sustained, then the connection between emotion and cognition will have been secured. But there is yet another way of establishing this connection, compatible with the perceptual model. This is to draw attention to the role of emotions as providing the framework for cognitions of the more conventional kind. de Sousa (1987) and Amélie Rorty (1980) propose this sort of account, according to which emotions are not so much perceptions as they are ways of seeing—species of determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies (see also Roberts 2003).de Sousa, Ronald, “Emotion“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Emotion”
“Under the Heading of #6. Perceptual Theories-A crucial mandate of cognitivist theories is to avert the charge that emotions are merely “subjective.” But propositional attitudes are not the only cognitive states. A more basic feature of cognition is that is has a “mind-to-world direction of fit.” The expression is meant to sum up the contrast between cognition and the conative orientation, in which success is defined in terms of the opposite, world-to-mind, direction of fit (Searle 1983). We will or desire what does not yet exist, and deem ourselves successful if the world is brought into line with the mind’s plan
The exploration of questions raised by these characteristics is a thriving ongoing collaborative project in the theory of emotions, in which philosophy will continue both to inform and to draw on a wide range of philosophical expertise as well as the parallel explorations of other branches of cognitive science. Conclusion: Adequacy Conditions on Philosophical Theories of Emotion -de Sousa, Ronald, “Emotion”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Emotion”
“Thus, secondary reflection is one important aspect of our access to the self. It is the properly philosophical mode of reflection because, in Marcel’s view, philosophy must return to concrete situations if it is to merit the name “philosophy.” These difficult reflections are “properly philosophical” insofar as they lead to a more truthful, more intimate communication with both myself and with any other person whom these reflections include (Marcel 1951a, pp. 79–80). Secondary reflection, which recoups the unity of experience, points the way toward a fuller understanding of the participation alluded to in examples of the mysterious.Primary and Secondary Reflection-Treanor, Brian, “Gabriel (-Honoré) Marcel”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming Marcel Gabriele.”
“Early decision theorists recognized the importance of emotion and discussed it in detail (e.g., Bentham, 1789; Jevons, 1871; Smith, 1759). Nevertheless, emotions did not make it into decision research because they were seen as intrinsically unstable and unpredictable, partly because they could not be measured objectively. Today, most problems with unpredictability and immeasurability of emotions have been solved. Emotions can be reliably measured in various verbal (e.g., via rating scales) and non-verbal ways (e.g., via FACS or facial EMG’s; Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999; Parrott, & Hertel, 1999). More- over, the impact of emotion on behavior is actually sim- pler and more systematic than previously thought. Emo- tions behave lawfully (Frijda, 1988, 2006), and their con- sequences are clear, stable and quite predictable. This has opened up opportunities for an integrative account of the different emotional influences on decision making. We present such an account in this article.On emotion specificity in decision making: Why feeling is for doing-(PDF) Marcel Zeelenberg∗1, Rob M. A. Nelissen1, Seger M. Breugelmans2, & Rik Pieters3 1 Department of Social Psychology and TIBER, Tilburg University 2 Department of Developmental, Clinical and Cross-cultural Psychology, Tilburg University 3 Department of Marketing and TIBER, Tilburg University”
“We can now restate our opening questions. Is the special felt qualitative tendency in valence, as it is structurally represented in descriptive theories, an intrinsic feature of emotion experience as such; that is, something that exists prior to the self-reports that describe it? Or is it instead created and structured by features of second-order awareness, such as these self- reports? The argument here is that valence is created by attention in sec- ond-order awareness. There is nothing scientifically objective or precise that we can say about valence apart from its elaboration in second-order awareness. Second-order awareness does not create the underlying phenomenology of emotion experience, but it does shape and articulate what exactly it means to us. This conclusion would appear to threaten the scientific foundation of descriptive theories of affect, because it undermines the objectivity of the phenomenon they claim to study. It also contradicts the driving assumption of several dominant neuroscientific theories of valence, according to which valence is an intrinsic objective property of affective experience.Emotion Experience and the Indeterminacy of Valence by LOUIS C. CHARLAND”
“Emotions are the key to the human decision making processes since decisions and actions are primary irrational and not cognitive–The Emotions in Emotions Analytics“
” The sort of mental processes described as cognitive are largely influenced by research which has successfully used this paradigm in the past, likely starting with Thomas Aquinas, who divided the study of behavior into two broad categories: cognitive (how we know the world), and affective (how we understand the world via feelings and emotions)[disputed ]. Consequently, this description tends to apply to processes such as memory, association, concept formation, pattern recognition, language, attention, perception, action, problem solving and mental imagery. Traditionally, emotion was not thought of as a cognitive process. This division is now regarded as largely artificial, and much research is currently being undertaken to examine the cognitive psychology of emotion; research also includes one’s awareness of one’s own strategies and methods of cognition called metacognition and includes metamemory.
Research into cognition is usually scientific and quantitative, or involves creating models to describe or explain certain behaviors. Cognition“
The part of the body in which the soul directly exercises its functions is not the heart at all, or the whole of the brain. It is rather the innermost part of the brain, which is a certain very small gland situated in the middle of the brain’s substance and suspended above the passage through which the spirits in the brain’s anterior cavities communicate with those in its posterior cavities. The slightest movements on the part of this gland may alter very greatly the course of these spirits, and conversely any change, however slight, taking place in the course of the spirits may do much to change the movements of the gland” (AT XI:351, CSM I:340). The Passions of the Soul “
“The thymus was known to the ancient Greeks, and its name comes from the Greek word θυμός (thumos), meaning “anger”, or “heart, soul, desire, life”, possibly because of its location in the chest, near where emotions are subjectively felt; or else the name comes from the herb thyme (also in Greek θύμος or θυμάρι), which became the name for a “warty excrescence”, possibly due to its resemblance to a bunch of thyme Thymus -“
“The James–Lange theory has remained influential. Its main contribution is the emphasis it places on the embodiment of emotions, especially the argument that changes in the bodily concomitants of emotions can alter their experienced intensity. Most contemporary neuroscientists would endorse a modified James–Lange view in which bodily feedback modulates the experience of emotion.” (p. 583)James–Lange theory -“
TEDxSF – Roz Picard – Emotion Technology –http://youtu.be/ujxriwApPP4
The advances made and put forth here paint a different picture then the one assumed here in regard to the development of emotions that work toward identifying innate characteristics of the person? As well, as factors that are now discernible physiologically with regard to the economics of barter and trade. This observation goes back to principle inherent in wireless communication(as fractal antennas) and the work of Benoit Mandelbrot who brought forward through recognition, its utilization of fractals and development by Seth Cohen.
See also: The Logic of Scientific Discovery (PDF)